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Framing the European Integration Process: Country-, Party- or
Issue-Specific?
Abstract
This paper proposes to study how the European integration process is framed. Such an analysis helps us
better understand how the European Union is perceived and which arguments are mobilized to support
or oppose it. We will test a series of hypotheses that have so far only been tested in individual countries.
Drawing on Habermas' typology of pragmatic-, identity- and value-related arguments we provide
sophisticated frame categorizations to capture the complex structure of argumentation and to go beyond
a simple dichotomization of economic and cul-tural frames. Relaying on a large media dataset for the
period from 2004 to 2006 in six Western European countries we not only look at how political actors
argue, but also whether framing strategies vary across countries and issues that are debated. We will
come to the conclusion that the way the European Union is perceived de-pends a lot on the actors that
are involved in the debate and the issues that are at stake.
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Abstract: This paper proposes to study how the European integration process is 
framed. Such an analysis helps us better understand how the European Union is 
perceived and which arguments are mobilized to support or oppose it. We will test 
a series of hypotheses that have so far only been tested in individual countries. 
Drawing on Habermas’ typology of pragmatic-, identity- and value-related argu-
ments we provide sophisticated frame categorizations to capture the complex struc-
ture of argumentation and to go beyond a simple dichotomization of economic and 
cultural frames. Relaying on a large media dataset for the period from 2004 to 2006 
in six Western European countries we not only look at how political actors argue, 
but also whether framing strategies vary across countries and issues that are de-
bated. We will come to the conclusion that the way the European Union is per-
ceived depends a lot on the actors that are involved in the debate and the issues that 
are at stake. 
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Introduction 
So far, studies that have investigated struggles over the European integration process have 
mainly been interested in whether the EU is at all an important issue in the public debate 
(Trenz 2003; de Vreese 2005), who participates in the debate (Koopmans 2007), how and 
why political actors and citizens position themselves towards the EU (Marks and Steenbergen 
2004) or how the electorate behaves in European elections (Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 
2007). This paper discusses an aspect that has been neglected to a certain extent in the litera-
ture on the European integration process. We think that besides analyzing positions of politi-
cal actors we should also be interested in why certain actors are against and others in favor of 
the European Union. By doing so, we should not simply look at which characteristics of a 
country, an individual citizen or a political party correlates with the respective positions, but 
which concrete arguments are mobilized to justify positions. 
The main aim of this paper is thus to investigate how the European integration process 
is framed. Analyzing framing processes will give us a deeper insight in how the European 
Union is perceived and helps us better understand positions towards the integration process. 
We agree with Diez Medrano (2003: 5) that one’s attitudes towards objects or problems de-
pend on how one conceives or represents them. We also follow Mair’s (2007: 162) recent call 
that “in addition to the imputed location of a party’s core identity, and in addition to the evi-
dence provided by the formal policies which it adopts or is obliged to adopt, we need to know 
more about how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, as well as about the way 
in which it is conceived […].” 
A second aim is to disaggregate the debate on the European integration process and to 
show how extensive the argumentation is. This implies that we allow for a sophisticated 
frame categorization in order to capture the various arguments that exist and to go beyond the 
simple differentiation between economic and cultural arguments. On the basis of Habermas’ 
(1993) typology of pragmatic-, identity- and value-related arguments we will propose differ-
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ent useful categorizations. Disaggregating the framing process also means that we look at 
different actors and different situations. We are not only interested in how the European Un-
ion is conceived in different Western European states. We also look at the argumentation of 
political parties and more generally of supporters and nonsupporters of the integration proc-
ess. We will pay particular attention to the framing strategies of the right-wing populist forces 
and how their discourse influences overall national debates. Finally, we also think that the 
argumentation depends a lot on which issue is debated. We are thus in the position to find out 
whether the way the European Union is perceived depends on the countries where it is dis-
cussed, the political actors that are involved or the issues that are at the core of the debate. 
 To find an answer to these questions we collected our data on the basis of newspaper 
articles for the period 2004 to 2006 in six Western European countries: Austria, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Having such a large database at 
hand we will be in the position to test arguments that have already been formulated by other 
scholars but only verified in individual countries. Moreover, by relying on media data instead 
of party programs or expert interviews we can investigate the supply of politically relevant 
actors for the electorate more precisely.  
 
Framing positions towards the European Union 
Most studies that have so far been interested in how European Union is perceived have fo-
cused on the way frames are used in the media. An important contribution has been made by 
de Vreese (2005: ch.4; see also de Vreese, Peter and Semetko 2001) who analyzed whether 
the media emphasize disagreements and conflicts between different entities when they cover 
the European Union or whether they frame events and issues in terms of their economic im-
plications. Trenz (2005: 262-268) adopts similar frame categories as we do (see below) and 
distinguishes whether the arguments used in the media are interest-, value or identity related. 
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Diez Medrano (2003: ch.4) is interested, among others, in how journalists present the EU in 
op-ed articles and how their opinions correspond with the attitudes of the populations. 
While theses studies help us understand how the EU is presented in different countries 
and might thus have an effect on public opinions, we do not learn much about the arguments 
of particular political actors. In this paper we are not interested in the role and strategies of the 
media, but how political actors and in particular political parties justify their attitudes towards 
the European integration process. The most advanced work on how the European Union is 
framed is probably the study conducted by Diez Medrano (2003) on how to explain diverging 
attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. He argues that 
these differences are influenced by national cultures and major historical events. While there 
are certain similarities among the populations of these three countries, Diez Medrano ob-
serves that Germans criticize the EU’s democratic deficit and worry about competition in the 
labor market, while Britons worry about losing their national identity. Finally, Spaniards see 
the EU as an opportunity to modernize their country and break with a long isolationist tradi-
tion. 
We have no space here to verify the influence of specific cultural and historical char-
acteristics of the countries where the debates take place. With regard to country differences 
we prefer to differentiate between countries that are rather in favor and those where a majority 
opposes a further European integration process. For the six countries under investigation in 
this paper Kriesi (2007) has already shown that Euroscepticism is particularly widespread in 
the UK and the non-member state of Switzerland. Which arguments can we expect in these 
countries? Diez Medrano (2003) shows that supporters emphasize economic advantages of 
the single market and the EU’s expected contribution to peace and a better understanding be-
tween peoples. Nonsuppporters, on the other hand, point to the threat of the integration proc-
ess to national identity and sovereignty. We further hypothesize that supporters—be it coun-
tries or political actors—lead a much more pragmatic discourse over concrete problems as 
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they have accepted the EU as a historical fact, contrary to Eurosceptics who rather mobilize 
fundamental and ideological arguments. In other words, we expect that those in favor of the 
EU not only use economic but also political frames that refer to the efficiency of the political 
system and procedural questions. 
Diez Medrano is mainly interested in the attitudes of ordinary citizens, journalists and 
local elites without regrouping them according to their political affiliation in order to find 
differences among political groups. However, since political parties are crucial political forces 
in the debate on European integration we aim at investigating in more detail their arguments. 
Koopmans (2007) has shown that the European integration process has remained a project of 
the political elite and that core state actors such as heads of states and government, cabinet 
ministers and central banks are the most present actors in these debates. Legislative and party 
actors are less well represented but still more important than the extremely weak civil society 
or unions and business organizations. 
One of the only studies that has explored the arguments of political parties in the con-
text of European integration debates has been executed by Statham and Grey (2005) in the 
United Kingdom. They identify three conceptual lenses through which political actors formu-
late the relationship to Europe: political, economic and cultural-historical (Statham and Grey 
2005: 74). They show that Eurosceptic conservatives heavily rely on political arguments 
while pro-Europeans from both major British parties emphasize the economic aspects. By 
showing that only a modest number of political actors uses cultural and historical arguments 
they further confirm their expectation that Euroscepticism is only to a limited extent populist 
and cultural in nature (see also Statham 2008: 38). 
 Van Os (2005) explores the framing of Europe by French political parties on the basis 
of the contents of their respective websites. He also distinguishes interest/instrumental, iden-
tity and value frames and reveals that both defenders and opponents of the European Union 
refer to strategic actions and specific interests when discussing this issue. As of the two other 
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groups of frames it is interesting to see that the major forces opposing the EU—the Front na-
tional and the Movement pour la France—adopt arguments that are different form all other 
parties. While all established parties express something like a European identity and mention 
democratic values when referring to this supranational entity, the right-wing populists defend 
a national identity and do not use universal value frames at all. 
 It appears that it is useful to make a differentiation between supporting and non-
supporting political parties. By looking at positions and justifications together we learn to 
differentiate between arguments that are mobilized to support the integration process and 
those that are used to criticize it. Koopmans (2007) has revealed that the standing of political 
actors is very much related to patterns of support for and opposition to the European integra-
tion process. While prominent actors are mostly in favor, less influential actors tend to be 
more critical of European institutions. Other studies focusing on political parties came to 
similar conclusions. A recurrent theme in the literature is the inverted ‘U’ pattern for party 
alignments on Europe (Hix and Lord 1997; Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2004). 
According to this thesis opposition to Europe comes from the far left and the far right while 
centre parties have adopted a generally pro-integrationist account. 
It is however debated whether the ‘permissive consensus’ among mainstream political 
parties towards the European integration process still exists or whether critical voices have 
also gained influential positions within major political parties. Statham (2008) has observed 
that in the last years Euroscepticism has become more important among mainstream parties. 
Kriesi (2007: 88) argues that established conservative parties are likely to take an accommo-
dating stance towards Euroscepticism of minor right-wing populist parties in order to close 
off their niche in the electoral market. Consequently, Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) argue that the 
issue of European integration has become more salient and more controversial in countries, in 
which right-wing populists have gained power in the last decade. The influence of right-wing 
populists is mainly due to the fact that by adopting a general pro-integrationist stance the es-
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tablished parties have for a long time ignored the part of the electorate that is opposed to a 
further integration process (Hix and Lord 1997). Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008) further emphasize 
that partly due to the mobilization by right-wing populists identity and cultural aspects bear a 
lot of Eurosceptic potential. Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2009, forthcoming) argue that the 
mobilization of exclusive national identity among mass publics by parties who emphasize 
traditionalism, authority and nationalism (their famous tan-dimension) has had an important 
impact on the debate in recent years. 
The question is furthermore whether we fall short of understanding how the European 
integration process is perceived if we do not differentiate between different subissues. It 
might very well be that political parties do not simply support or refuse the integration proc-
ess. On the contrary, we can expect variations across policy fields. Since European integration 
consists of economic, political and cultural projects parties might take diverging positions 
(see Marks 2004: 241-343; Marks, Hooghe and Wilson 2004). For example, parties of the 
center-left are often said to be in favor of more integration if particular projects focus on 
‘market-regulation’. Social democrats are in favor of lowering cultural boundaries but are 
afraid of losing social achievements at the national level. On the other hand, those on the po-
litical right become opposed when the integration process concerns more than a simple eco-
nomic and monetary union. Liberal conservative parties often support a further integration 
process as long it mainly concerns market liberalization but are opposed when political or 
cultural aspects are concerned (Kriesi 2007: 86-87). It will be interesting to observe whether 
such differences can also be observed with regard to the frames that are used in the context of 
the various subissues of the European integration process. In other words, we will investigate 
whether the framing strategies that we will have revealed for the general debates on the Euro-
pean integration process are the same across subfields. Before we test these arguments, how-
ever, we first have to specify what we understand by ‘framing’ and which frame categories 
we use for our analyses. 
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Framing - Clarifying and distinguishing our approach 
According to a highly influential definition by Robert Entman, framing means to “select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation” (1993: 52, italics in original). Unlike agenda-setting, 
which is primarily concerned with salience, framing not only tells people what to think about, 
but more importantly, how to think about a particular issue. The underlying assumption of the 
approach is that the way an issue is presented in the media can influence how it is understood 
and evaluated by the audience (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 11). The evaluation of abor-
tion polices, to mention a classic example, sharply differs if one thinks of abortion as a ques-
tion of life or death, or if it is framed as a matter of women’s rights and civil liberties (see 
Ferree et al. 2002). Empirical studies show that framing actually has an effect on individual 
attitudes even in a conflictive environment where competing frames are at work (e.g. Zaller 
1992: ch.9; Brewer and Gross 2005; Chong and Druckmann 2007; skeptical Sniderman and 
Theriault 2004). 
Whereas the term frame denotes the “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974: 21), 
which guide our perception of reality, framing refers to the more or less consciously managed 
process during which these schemata are manufactured, selected, distributed and adopted. For 
political contestations in the public this process can be divided into four distinct stages (Mat-
thes 2007: ch.2).  In the 1st stage frames are promoted by competing political actors. Drawing 
on established cultural resources, they adopt a framing strategy which aims at creating a 
maximum of public support. This stage is therefore called strategic framing. However, politi-
cal actors’ statements do not get direct public attention. Before being published and becoming 
part of the public debate, they are in a 2nd stage selected and arranged by journalists. This pro-
cedure provides the latter with the opportunity to (re-)frame particular statements or whole 
articles according to the norms and routines of the media system (journalistic framing). The 
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output of these previous activities are frames as they appear in mass media products, e.g. 
newspapers (3rd stage). The 4th and last stage is the impact of frames on individuals’ attitudes 
and their own framing of issues, the framing effects.  
The frames that we investigate in our study can be conceptualized as the outcome of 
the “framing contest” (Gamson 2004: 245) between political actors of the 1st stage, partly 
modified by journalists’ mediation efforts during the 2nd stage. Furthermore, the practical 
relevance of these media frames of the 3rd stage stems from the fact that they decisively shape 
how the debated issue is perceived by the audience, thereby influencing individuals’ attitudes 
in the 4th stage of the framing process. In contrast to the majority of media framing studies, 
which usually focus on the whole article (e.g. de Vreese 2005; Trenz 2003), we analyze media 
frames on a propositional level. This means that we coded frames for every statement in an 
article and that these frames had to be clearly attributable to a particular political actor (see 
below). This idea of frame ownership enables us to keep the aspect of strategic framing in our 
analysis of media frames as we not only like to answer the question how the debate is framed 
but also, and equally important, by whom.  
As outlined above, we are interested in the framing of issue positions by political ac-
tors in the mass media, and therefore propose to define frames as patterns of justification. We 
would like to know which justifications are put forward by a political actor to support his or 
her position regarding a particular issue. We have to keep in mind, however, that in reality 
political actors do not argue as consistently and explicitly as we as political scientists would 
wish them to do so. Quite often they evoke a particular argumentative context by dropping a 
few keywords or rely on metaphors and symbols. As a consequence, the term pattern of justi-
fication is understood for our purpose in a fairly broad sense and also includes rather latent 
and implicit arguments.  
It is worth noting that our definition of frames bears resemblance to Entman’s “prob-
lem-definition” aspect in his above mentioned, very encompassing definition of what framing 
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is. One could even go further and conceive the attributed issue in a statement as “treatment 
recommendation”, and think of an actor’s stance (position) as element of the “evaluative 
component” of a frame (see also Matthes 2007: 127-130). However, for our analysis it is use-
ful to keep justifications, actors, issues and positions separated. We will therefore use our 
more narrow definition and restrict the meaning of the term frame to patterns of justifications.  
 
Categorizing frames 
In order to systematically structure the various frames, which are attributed to policy positions 
in the mass media debate, we draw on a distinction made by Habermas’s (1993), which has 
proven useful for the study of multilayered issues like the European integration (Sjursen 
2002; Trenz 2005; Lerch and Schwellnus 2006). Habermas’ (1993) typology distinguishes 
three types of possible frames: pragmatic, identity-based and moral-universal frames. The 
first type, pragmatic frames, consists of arguments referring to the expected utility of a policy. 
A pragmatic frame justifies a position by its efficiency to reach a specific goal or by its poten-
tial to meet particular interests (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006: 306). Secondly, positions can be 
justified by identity-based arguments. These frames legitimize policies by pointing to ideas 
and values inherent to a particular community. The third type, moral-universal arguments, is 
exploited by actors referring to “universal standards of justice“ (Sjursen 2002: 494f.), which 
can be accepted by everyone, regardless of his or her particular interests or cultural identity. 
In contrast to the existing studies that use these three frame categories and in order to 
meet our research goals, we propose some additional categorizations (see Table 1). At first, 
our research objectives lead us to be more specific about the content of the three frame cate-
gories. Within the pragmatic category, we like to distinguish political from economic and 
other pragmatic reasons. Political reasons aim at the efficiency of the political system or are 
directly connected either to a strategy of a specific actor or to a procedural process. Economic 
reasons comprise welfare, budgetary and private sector frames. Other pragmatic reasons con-
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stitutes a residual category and consists of less salient frames like ecology, security and infra-
structural reasons. 
 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
 
The identity-based frames can first be separated into national-exclusive and national-
institutional frames. The first subcategory summarizes nationalistic and xenophobic frames as 
well as those pointing to the preservation of traditional values. National-institutional frames 
cover arguments related to the political self-determination and national independence. While 
these two frame types are used by political actors who prefer closed cultural boundaries and a 
culturally homogeneous society, multicultural-inclusive reasons contain the exactly opposing 
arguments like cultural plurality and tolerance. The last of the three main categories, moral-
universal frames, is not further differentiated. It is composed of general moral principles like 
peace or equality of opportunities and their legalistic counterparts, basic civic and political 
rights. 
A second additional categorization aims at aggregating the three main categories. In 
order to test how important cultural frames are in the debate on European integration we like 
to create a category that brings together all frames that are cultural in nature. Whereas prag-
matic types of frames can be perceived as arguments following an instrumental rationality 
(Sjursen 2002), both identity-based and moral-universal types can be understood in a Webe-
rian sense as cultural frames (Weber 1921[1980]: 12). These arguments have in common that 
they emanate from a rationality based on moral, religious or ethnical values, norms or habits 
in oppositon to the utilitaristic interest characterizing the pragmatic frames. We thus have two 
distinctively different kinds of justification patterns for a policy position, the first being utili-
taristic (or pragmatic) in nature and containing the reasoning for the political or economical 
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interest, and the second being cultural and containing values deduced from identity or moral 
principles. 
Having three different kinds of categorizations at hand we end up with a list of frames 
which can be generalized in a flexible way to fit our specific research questions. One aim of 
this study is to test whether political, economic or cultural frames are more often used when 
positions are taken towards the European integration process. To this end, we will compare 
the cultural frames at the highest level of aggregation with the economic and political reasons 
at the lowest level of aggregation. We expect that opposition parties (right-wing populists and 
radical-left parties) adopt a more fundamental ideological discourse while mainstream parties 
who are part of the ‘permissive consensus’ use more pragmatic frames (political and eco-
nomic reasons). To better understand how cultural frames are used we will investigate 
whether supporters of the EU rather use multicultural-inclusive and moral-universalist frames, 
while the non-supporters mainly mobilize national-exclusive and national-institutional argu-
ments. 
 
Data and data collection 
In order to get a comprehensive picture of the debate on the European integration process, we 
conduct a comparative study of six Western European countries (Austria, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom). We collected data on the basis of news-
paper articles for the three years 2004, 2005 and 2006, which enables us to observe the most 
recent development of the debate. 
 There is little doubt in the literature that the mass media constitute the most important 
arena for public debates on politically relevant issues (see Ferree et al. 2002; Bennett et al. 
2004). An analysis of newspapers therefore allows us to analyze the statements of political 
actors, which are directly perceived by their opponents, policy makers and the broader audi-
ence. For the question of feasibility we were not able to include more than one newspaper per 
 13 
country in the analysis. The newspaper sample thus contains Le Monde in France, The Times 
in the United Kingdom, the Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany, the NRC Handelsblad in the 
Netherlands, Die Presse in Austria and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Switzerland. We decided 
to rely on quality newspapers since they are most likely to exert a key influence on other me-
dia actors. These newspapers exhibit a high probability to be read by other domestic journal-
ists and to influence editorial decisions of other news organizations (Bennett et al. 2004: 445). 
Furthermore, Koopmans and Statham (1999: 207) have shown for their Political Claims 
Analysis approach—a method comparable to ours in terms of basic coding instructions—that 
there are no significant differences in the positioning of political actors between quality 
newspapers and tabloids. 
 Our content analysis is based on an innovative approach of selecting newspaper arti-
cles as well as collecting data. We apply a three-step procedure to obtain a representative 
sample of relevant articles. The first step is the identification of relevant events in each coun-
try that are related to the European integration process. The events were identified by means 
of various yearbooks such as Keesing's World Record of Events and Facts on Files (World 
News Digest Yearbook). This list of events constitutes the basis for the development of an 
extensive keyword list for each country, which helped us to electronically find all relevant 
articles.1 Relying on event lists has the advantage that we know about the relevant discussions 
in each country before we deploy a keyword search. This is especially important regarding 
such a complex issue like the European integration, which is disputed in many different ways 
in every country. Thus, we can avoid much of the risk of false negatives in our selection pro-
cedure.  
 Since we were still confronted with an immense number of articles per newspaper 
(approximately 30’000 per country), we engaged another selection step. Following our aim to 
grasp the core of the debate regarding the European Union, i.e. to include only the most rele-
                                                
1 All the newspaper titles in our sample are accessible electronically via the databases Factiva or LexisNexis. 
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vant articles into our content analysis, we grouped the events to subissues and ranked them 
according to their salience in the basic sample. Only the most frequent subissues were re-
tained for the next selection step, which allowed us to reduce the samples to approximately 
3’000 to 4’000 per country. 
 In the final third step, we chronologically selected a random sample of 1’200 articles 
per country out of the subissue selection. A chronological selection helped us account for the 
dynamic of the debate. Time-invariant newspaper selection procedures, e.g. the selection of 
all articles published on a certain weekday, fail to capture the differences in the intensity of a 
debate and do not take into account when more articles are published in certain time periods. 
A chronological random sampling instead follows the occurrence distribution of relevant arti-
cles and, therefore, the peaks and slacks of the debate. 
 The articles selected are coded sentence-by-sentence using the method of 'core sen-
tences'. This approach has its origins in early theoretical elaborations by Wittgenstein (1984 
[1921]) and was first implemented into concrete coding instructions by Osgood (1956) and 
Axelrod (1976). Recently, it has been renewed for the analysis of party systems (Kriesi et al., 
2006; Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder and Rietberg 1997). Additionally, Franzosi (2004: 60f.) has 
provided theoretical and empirical evidence that the method—he calls it ‘story grammars’—is 
a useful device for the social sciences in general. ‘Core sentences’ are an inductive approach 
to capture the full complexity of the political debate without imposing strong theoretical ex-
pectations, e.g. in terms of previously fixed category schemas, on the data. 
 The basic idea of this method is that both the latent as well as the manifest content of 
every written document can be described as a network of relationships between objects. For 
the purpose of our project we code every relationship between 'political objects' (i.e. between 
a political actor and a political issue) that appears in the text. Each sentence is reduced to its 
most basic structure (the so-called 'core sentence') indicating only its subject (political actor) 
and its object (issue) as well as the direction of the relationship between the two. The direc-
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tion is quantified using a scale ranging from ‘-1’ to ‘+1’ (with three intermediary positions). 
In substantive terms, such a core sentence is the opinion of an actor towards an issue. Each of 
these positionings is complemented by up to five justifications, by which actors explain and 
endorse their statement. This is because actors back their policy position in the public debate 
often by multiple frames, either to discuss a complex issue persuasively or to gain support 
from different audiences at the same time (Lerch and Schwellnus: 307). Table 2 gives a short, 
illustrative example of a core sentence. 
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
 As Kriesi et al. (2006) have shown, we can investigate the supply of politically rele-
vant actors for the electorate more precisely with media data than it is possible with more 
common data like party manifesto data, expert surveys or roll call data. Newspapers are the 
better source to grasp new issues and the direct confrontation between political actors. Fur-
thermore, it is argued that the image of a political party is much better represented in the me-
dia than in party manifestos, which hardly any ordinary citizen reads. 
 
Disaggregating the debate on the European integration process 
Let us now turn to the empirical results of our study. Before we focus in more detail on the 
framing of the European integration process, this first section provides the necessary context 
by presenting an overview of how the public debate in the years 2004-2006 is thematically 
structured in the six countries under study. Table 3 reports the salience of the various Euro-
pean-integration issues, i.e. their relative share of core sentences in the media coverage. As 
could be expected for a debate which is highly driven by events and institutional actors on the 
European level, we observe a fairly similar pattern across countries: The two by far most sali-
ent issues in all member states are the enlargement process—which includes the accession of 
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Romania and Bulgaria (south-eastern enlargement) on the one hand, and the question of Tur-
key’s membership on the other—and the constitutional treaty. These two key issues account 
on average for more than half of the media coverage and heavily dominate the debate on 
Europe. The enlargement process is by far the most important issue in Austria and Germany 
with a salience of 50 and 38 per cent, respectively. In the UK, France and the Netherlands the 
constitutional treaty ranks number one with 32, 37 and 25 per cent, respectively. This issue’s 
comparatively high salience in the UK is somehow surprising, as—unlike in France and the 
Netherlands—no referendum was held there during the time period under study. 
A not surprising exception to this general pattern is Switzerland, which shows less, but 
for a non-EU member state still considerable, interest in the enlargement process (13 per 
cent) and the constitutional treaty (19 per cent). The focus of the debate here is clearly on the 
then ongoing second round of bilateral negotiations with the European Union. The two most 
controversial issues of these bilateral treaties were the extension of the agreement on the free 
movement of persons to the new CEE EU-member states and the Schengen/Dublin accord2, 
both finally approved by the Swiss citizens in a referendum. Taken together, these three issues 
account for 46 per cent of all statements in Switzerland. 
 
-- Table 3 about here -- 
 
There are a few other country-specific characteristics worth mentioning. Infringements 
of the stability pact drew considerable public attention to the monetary union in four of the 
five member countries (more than 10 per cent salience in Austria, the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands). Unlike the other countries, the UK shows heightened interest in the budgetary 
framework for 2007-13 (15 per cent), fiercely defending the “British rebate” against concerted 
attacks from other member states. Another country specific characteristic is the high salience 
                                                
2 As the Schengen agreement and the Dublin convention are part of the “Area of freedom, security and justice”, 
we subsume them under the label security. 
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of questions of market liberalization and (re-)regulation in France. These two economic is-
sues, the two sides of the same coin, account together for 19 per cent of all statements in the 
French debate.  
In addition to salience, polarization is another indicator of political relevance. Table 3 
also reports the mean value of all positions on a given issue for each country.  A value of +1 
or -1 would be a sign of perfect positive or negative unanimity among political actors, 
whereas a value close to ‘0’ indicates that they are deeply divided on a certain issue. In all 
member countries we observe a high overall level of polarization (values close to 0), which on 
a very general level supports the claim that the days of the (permissive) consensus in Euro-
pean integration politics are over (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Only the UK debate is consid-
erably less polarized and adoptes a general Eurosceptical attitude (-0.30), a finding substanti-
ated by the almost identical negative value for the issue EU-integration in general. This skep-
tical attitude towards the EU has also been observed by Statham (2008: 19) for a less recent 
period of time for British parties and is explained by Diez Medrano (2003) with the distinct 
historical legacy of the Empire. Switzerland again is an outlier being strongly in favor of 
European integration (0.29). However, this finding has to be interpreted with some reserva-
tions considering the non-member status of Switzerland and the fact that the highly controver-
sial question of EU-membership was largely absent in the debate during the period under 
study. Moreover, the bilateral treaties were also supported by Eurosceptics, which conceived 
them as a viable alternative to accession.  
 
Let us now turn to the core question of how the European integration process is framed. In a 
first step we are simply interested in an overall picture and show how the various issues we 
identified in the preceding part are framed (see Table 4). All the following tables are struc-
tured as follows: the first three rows list the different pragmatic frames. The fourth row lists 
the aggregated cultural arguments, which consists of Habermas’ identity and value frames. In 
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the lower part of each table we disaggregate the cultural frames according to the frame struc-
ture we presented above. 
As we see in Table 4, four out of the ten main issues, namely monetary union, market 
liberalization, regulation and the free movement of persons are framed predominantly eco-
nomically. Political actors place these issues in the context of welfare, unemployment, eco-
nomic gains or budgetary constraints. If the debate largely consisted of these issues, one 
might convincingly argue that European integration is best described as being an integral part 
of the classic economic dimension of political conflict as the regulation model proposes (see 
Steenbergen and Marks 2004).  
 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
 
There is, however, a second and in terms of salience much larger cluster of issues in-
cluding EU-integration in general, the constitutional treaty, enlargement and, somehow sur-
prising, the EU-budget. These issues all show a comparatively low share of economic argu-
ments and are framed heavily in terms of culture: Identity-based arguments in favor of na-
tional exclusion, independence or multiculturalism on the one hand, and moral-universalistic 
justifications like justice or solidarity on the other hand. Additionally, it is worth noting that 
the two by far most salient issues—the constitutional treaty and the enlargement process—
feature a share of identity-based frames which is above average. This supports the argument 
that questions of identity (and cultural motives in general) are the driving force of the growing 
Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2004).  
From all this it follows that European integration as a whole cannot be simply sub-
sumed either under an economic nor a cultural dimension. Moreover, utilitarian political mo-
tives account for a smaller, but still non-negligible share across all issues. The complex, 
multi-faceted structure of European integration issues apparently gives much leeway to politi-
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cal actors as to how to present them to their constituency. The concept of framing enables an 
analysis which preserves this complexity and helps us to better understand the debate on the 
European integration process. 
 
Frames by partygroups and countries 
For a more detailed analysis we are now interested in how frames are used differently among 
actor groups and countries. In Table 5 we first want to know which is the overall pattern of 
frames that are used by supporters and nonsupporters of the EU in order to verify whether the 
former argue more with economic and moral-universalist arguments and the latter with iden-
tity-related frames.3 If we only look at the three main groups of political, economic and cul-
tural frames we see that both groups of actors pursue a similar discourse. Contrary to Me-
drano’s argument, economic frames are even more prevalent among those with negative atti-
tudes towards the EU. Moreover, it clearly appears that the European Union is perceived as a 
cultural and political entity as much as it is considered as an economic space. If we disaggre-
gate the cultural frames our findings meet our expectations. While the non-supporters of the 
European integration process mobilize national-exclusive and national-institutional frames 
more often than the supporters, the latter are much more inclined to use multicultural-
inclusive and moral-universalist arguments. Surprisingly, the last group of frames is however 
also quite often used by the critics of the EU. If we look at the two groups of nationalistic 
frames, which differentiate between pro-sovereignty and civic nationalist frames on the one 
hand and xenophobic/ethnic nationalist arguments on the other hand, we see that both are 
equally important, which partly contradicts Statham and Grey’s (2005) findings. It is however 
true that, overall, nationalist frames are of rather minor importance even among the nonsup-
porters, which supports Statham’s (2008: 38) argument that a large majority of Eurosceptic 
positions are reasoned arguments. 
                                                
3 The two groups of supporters and nonsupporters include all actors that participate in the debate: political par-
ties, governments that do not belong to our six cases, EU-actors, interest groups, experts, unions etc. 
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-- Table 5 about here-- 
 
In a next step we like to investigate how political parties justify their positions.4 In or-
der to better understand the different types of argumentation and to link this part to the fore-
going discussion on the arguments of supporters and non-supporters at the very bottom of 
Table 5 we indicate for each party-family its position towards the European integration proc-
ess. It comes with no surprise that the extremist parties at the right and the left strongly op-
pose the current European integration process while the established Social democrats and 
Liberals as well as the Greens are clearly in favor of the European Union. The conservative 
forces take a rather ambivalent position. 
Overall, we see a clear difference of argumentation between major established parties 
that are in favor of the European integration process and the minor left and right-wing parties 
which are much more critical. Thus, we also observe some kind of ‘U’ pattern with regard to 
the use of frames. Again, the findings contradict those scholars who expect the supporters to 
mainly pursue an economic discourse. With the exception of the Social-democrats economic 
frames are much more used by the radical left and the right-wing populists. The established 
parties on the other hand justify their positive positions with political arguments and thereby 
refer to the efficiency of the political system and procedural questions. The very high number 
of economic frames used by the radical-left confirms the widely held argument that those 
forces oppose the current integration process as they consider the EU as neo-liberal construc-
tion and seek to protect the national working forces. Surprisingly, at least the last aspects 
seem also to be of importance for those at the other end of the political spectrum. Almost half 
                                                
4 We regrouped all political parties into six party-families: Radical left, Greens, Social democrats, Liberals, Con-
cervatives and Right-wing populists. The attribution of the individual parties is specified in the notes of Table 5. 
All political actors whose party affiliation could be identified were allotted to the respective party-groups. Thus, 
also actors that took positions, for example, in their function as head of states or ministers are included in the 
analysis. 
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of all arguments used by the right-wing populists belong however to the cultural group. At the 
disaggregated level we see that they use national-exclusive and national-institutional frames 
by far more often than the other parties. This gives support to those authors claiming that op-
ponents from the right argue mainly in cultural terms.  It is interesting to observe that the 
right-wing populists mobilize arguments with regard to political self-determination and na-
tional-independence more than xenophobic frames. All the other parties use the moral-
universalist justifications much more often. Especially for the radical-left and the greens, 
which are often considered as postmaterialist forces, moral-universalist discourses are quite 
important. 
 
The next question we would like to address is whether we observe similar frame patterns in 
all of our six countries. We mainly like to test whether there are differences between support-
ing and Eurosceptic countries and whether the presence of right-wing populist forces has an 
impact. In Table 6 we list the use of the different frames per country. Moreover, we also spec-
ify the discourse of the right-wing populists for those countries, in which they constitute rele-
vant political parties. While those forces are traditionally weak in the United Kingdom and 
Germany, surprisingly, in Austria we did not find enough arguments for the right-wing popu-
lists to include them in our analyses. It might be that the Freedom Party (FPÖ)—the major 
right wing populist force in this country—kept a low profile in criticizing the EU as they have 
been part of the coalition government in the first half of our time of investigation. The follow-
ing split-up in 2005 in a more moderate and a more radical faction did not have an observable 
impact on the low standing of these two right wing populist parties.   
 
-- Table 6 about here -- 
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As we have already seen in Table 3 Euroscepticism is particularly widespread in the 
United Kingdom. Although we got highly positive values for Switzerland for reasons we have 
already discussed, this non-member state is also often considered as particularly hostile to-
wards the European Union (Kriesi 2007). It is however difficult to see a systematic difference 
of argumentation in these two countries. While the national-exclusive and national-
institutional frames are on average slightly more often used in the UK than in the other coun-
tries, in Switzerland especially national-exclusive arguments are quite rare even among the 
right-wing populists. 
The Swiss specificity can be explained by the fact that during our time of investigation 
a major referendum was held over the bilateral treaties with the European Union. One of the 
major issues of these treaties was the question of free movement of persons, which was 
mainly discussed with regard to the economic implications of the introduction of such a re-
gime. An important argument in this context was that the opening of the borders would lead 
to higher unemployment and decreasing social security standards. While explicitly economic, 
this argumentation has at least some latent xenophobic connotations. If Switzerland had to 
decide on full EU-membership we would certainly have seen a much more cultural debate on 
Swiss identity, sovereignty and the role of central political institutions such as the direct de-
mocratic regime. However, the prevalence of economic frames in the context of the referen-
dum on the bilateral treaties has also to be seen in the light of the specific role and position of 
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP)—the major right wing populist force in this country. Contrary 
to the right-wing populists in other countries the SVP is an established political force. Moreo-
ver and contrary to its image among the electorate, the SVP is also a party that is very much 
concerned with economic issues such as tax and budget reduction (Kriesi et al. 2005). 
If we look at Table 6 we see that the right wing populists in the Netherlands and 
France hardly pursue an economic discourse but use much more than other parties national- 
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institutional and even more national-exclusive arguments.5 France and the Netherlands are 
also those two cases where the cultural frames are much more widespread than in the other 
countries. It is however not the case that the presence of right-wing populist forces leads to a 
more nationalist discourse among other parties. On the contrary, we see that the group of cul-
tural arguments consists mainly of multicultural and moral-universalist frames. It might be 
that in these two countries the discourse of the right wing populists was not adopted by other 
parties, but on the contrary lead to an important counter mobilization. It might also be that the 
referendum on the European Constitution that has been held in these two countries during our 
period of investigation has given rise to an excessive use of cultural frames. 
 
Frames by party- and issuegroups 
In our final analytical part we would like to know whether the frame patterns we observed for 
political parties are the same across all important issues that are part of the European integra-
tion process or whether the way the EU is perceived also depends on the different aspects of 
this process. We have shown above that two broad categories of issues can be distinguished in 
the debate on European integration according to how they are framed (see Table 4). There is a 
cluster of clearly economically framed issues and another more heterogeneous cluster com-
prising issues for which political, economical and cultural frames are mobilized. 
As the results in Table 7 reveal, there are indeed substantial differences among the 
party families. And it also matters which party takes position in the context of which issue. In 
addition to the information provided in the foregoing tables at the bottom of Table 7 we also 
list the salience of parties’ positionings. Comparing at first the two dominant party groups, the 
Social democrats and the Conservatives, they do not differ very much regarding the use of 
frames, but their discrepancy in positions and salience is striking. The Social democrats have 
clear but opposed positions towards the two issue categories. After we have shown in Table 5 
                                                
5 It thus appears that despite country weights the high number of economic frames for right-wing populists that 
we observed in Table 5 is mainly due to the discourse of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). 
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that, overall, they are in favor of the European integration process, Table 7 reveals that they 
clearly refuse a further economic integration. With 52 per cent of their stances made in the 
context of economic issues they are the party-family that is most present in the debate on eco-
nomic issues. The Conservatives, on the other hand, focus heavily on the diversely framed 
issues (47 per cent) and show comparatively low interest in the economic issues. Furthermore, 
the low values for the positions (0.08 and 0.06) indicate the highly ambivalent attitudes 
among and within the different Conservative Parties. In the center of the political spectrum, 
the Liberals are clearly in favor of the European integration process and show similar framing 
characteristics as the two large party groups. These three parties of the ‘permissive consensus’ 
alter their argumentation significantly: If the discourse does not center on economic issues, 
procedural and strategic as well as multicultural and moral-universalistic frames are getting 
far more important. 
It is getting interesting when we look at the framing strategies of the three remaining 
party groups at the poles of the political left-right scale. Both the Greens and the Radical-left 
pursue a very consistent discourse irrespective of the issues that are at the core of the debate. 
The patterns of justification of the Greens do not considerably vary between the two issue 
groups and center on moral-universalistic reasons as well as economic and other pragmatic 
arguments. The Greens emphasize pragmatic ecological frames, which are included in the 
category “other pragmatic”, more often than the other party groups. The Radical-left per-
ceives all issues and thus the European integration as a whole as predominantly economic.  
 
-- Table 7 about here -- 
 
As we already know, the seemingly inconsistent argumentation of the Right-wing 
populist parties is due to one party, the Swiss SVP. A further analysis reveals that almost all 
of the stances on economic issues stem from the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP; 110 of total 125 
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positions) and that these positions are responsible for the Right-wing populist’s high share of 
economic framing. It thus appears that the SVP strategically restrains their identity-based core 
argument, whereas the other Right-wing populists insist on the same identity-based argumen-
tation towards all issues. 
We conclude that the argumentation of the established actors depends on the issues 
that are at the core of the debate at a specific moment. Only the small parties of the Left—the 
Greens and Radical-Left—as well as the Right-wing populists (except the SVP) deviate from 
this general pattern. These parties outside the ‘permissive consensus’ frame all their positions 
in the same way, following their ideological beliefs. All other parties are shifting strategically 
from an economic to a more cultural and political discourse, depending on which issue is at 
stake. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to disaggregate the debate on the European integration process and to better 
understand how this process is perceived. By doing so, we did not simply look at who is in 
favor or against the European Union and which characteristics of the involved actors might 
explain their positions. Much more radically we wanted to know which arguments are mobi-
lized to support one’s positions. To capture the extensive debate on the European integration 
process we proposed an innovative and complex frame categorization that allowed us to ver-
ify different and detailed hypotheses. Relying on a new and extensive dataset we were in the 
position to look simultaneously at six different countries, various party groups and all relevant 
issues that were debated in the period from 2004 to 2006. We came to the conclusion that the 
way the European Union is perceived depends a lot on the actors that are involved and the 
issues that are debated. Country differences do only exist insofar as different issues are rele-
vant and different parties are part of the party-system. 
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Table 1: Frame structure 
utilitarian cultural 
pragmatic identity-based moral-universal 
political 
reasons 
economic 
reasons 
other pragmatic 
reasons 
national-
exclusive rea-
sons 
national-
institutional 
reasons 
multicultural-
inclusive rea-
sons 
basic rights and 
general moral princi-
ples 
 
 
Table 2: Example of the 'Core Sentence' method 
Le Monde, Jan. 14, 2005: “Chirac est favorable à l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Union européenne.“ (Chirac sup-
ports the EU accession of Turkey). 
actor direction issue 
Jacques Chirac +1 EU accession of Turkey 
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Table 3: Issue salience (percentages) and position by country  
Issues 
 
Austria 
 
United 
Kingdom 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Nether-
lands 
Switzer-
land 
EU-integration in general 6 9 6 6 6 6 
 0.02 -0.32 0.55 0.36 0.06 0.07 
       
Constitutional treaty 16 32 37 20 25 19 
 0.00 -0.32 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.29 
       
Enlargement  50 15 14 38 20 13 
(incl. eastern e., Turkey) -0.07 0.59 -0.34 0.00 0.01 0.15 
       
Monetary union  11 11 6 22 11 2 
(incl. stability pact) 0.32 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.41 - 
       
Market liberalization  2 2 10 0 3 3 
(incl. service directive) - 0.10 -0.68 - -0.22 -0.50 
       
Regulated capitalism  2 10 9 3 8 5 
(incl. CAP) -0.30 -0.78 0.59 -0.11 0.07 0.17 
       
Budgetary framework 07-13 2 15 8 2 8 3 
 - -0.53 0.36 - -0.63 - 
       
Bilateral treaties EU-
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 17 
 - - - - - 0.35 
       
Free movement of persons 3 2 0 2 2 15 
 - -0.47 - - -0.04 0.35 
       
Security  3 2 5 1 4 13 
(incl. Schengen) 0.15 0.04 0.64 - 0.07 0.28 
       
Other Issues 5 3 5 7 13 3 
 - - - - - - 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Positions 0.00 -0.30 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.29 
N 2'709 1'968 4'747 2'206 3'356 2'969 
Notes: Positions only reported if N>15. The indicator ‘positions’ varies between ‘-1’ and ‘1’. Issues with sali-
ence greater than 10 per cent are highlighted. In order to obtain a clear picture for every country, we have only 
included statements of national actors in this calculation. 
